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MNCs, Foreign Contractors, "\\fhitc Elephahts" 
and Nigeria's Economy: An Enquiry into 45 Years 
of Exploitation 
Sheriff Folarin 
Shcrit( l ;·oi,tTm /J of the /)t'furlmwi o{ Puiicy t~nrl Stra!r~ic StudieJ, Covenant 
UniNr.fil)'. Camw!liand. 0!!1. ,\(gena. 
Abstract 
Tbi.r paper t.\.Wilt!le.• !!}(' exkmulj(uior in T'<z~~eria j· eco!lomic underdevelopment 
.rintx independe;zL"e. 1 t .~peojiccil(r embark.~· on !JiJionml enquirie.r into the ro le 
~jmullinalional ,·ompa11ie.1 dllrl fore~~n i·ontrm:torJ J.}}ho.re activitie.r hazJe 
mntrilmted to 1!1e .lttci(!J' dedim: r!/!he J'\'z:gerian economy and the delay in the 
at:t:ompli..d;ing o/ thr: }\Jt~~eJi{/17 prqjed. '}fll~r decline mi.reJfrom the up.rurge of bogu.r 
"1./)hite elephant'' omd p!Ja!ltom de! 1elopmental pmjedYfor 1vhi.oh the contrador.r are 
.roug!Jt,from Jvluch /J;(~e pmfi.!J are .riphoned to their home countrie.r, and for ~vhich 
the co.rt of gmrm1mr htl.l /m"()!ne l:mrden.wme. Tbe paper redtttX!J the Nigerian 
ea;nomt~· que.~tion to //Ja! o/ externa(lador and appli.e.r it to e."fJlimte the economic 
dilemma. I I i.rpertinei!tly e.rt ab/iJherl t batt he po.rhi1ril war o7'a7Je for reamstrudion, 
engenden:d tbe ques({or mpid dm~lopmenl. w/JL1-h led to Jvbite elephant, neverwmpleted 
orpo01jy ai"c!J!77pkrhedprojed.i' tbat Ia/ to the J.})aJtc{~C.I. o{ hard earned t:apital.fi'om 
the black .~old. ']he nmltinatiollal,·, in m/la/Joration with greedy and opportttni.rtic 
local elemenl.i' inlm.,ine.r.• . ~.i1 'li .~o,ie(y. militur)' and_~oi;ernment, reading the favourable 
undermrrentJ cauxed ~)'the oil-boom, oz•envlxlmerl Nigen·a Ji!itl; the quext to ben~fit 
from il.r JJJtl.l'tejit! e.'Penditttre on impo.r.rible or n:aiLj·tic but ill-timed gargantuan 
prqjedr. J\'~ge1ia JJJa.,t!m.,· t!h' emeJ;gml.~o!dmine in Jub-SaiJaranAfrica. Tbi.rpiece 
pnn·ide.\ a cntaalrotnreJorpo!it.l" maken i11 nation b!!ilding to n:-apprai.re the role 
of mtt!tinationuf, JoftrJJ/it/J t/Je ;-icJJ/ to li/xrali11,~ the: cmmtryfrom their ewnomic 
gfidlo,k. 
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Introduction 
The Nigerian economic project so far has been a failed one. l\fany 
:·cars of military experimentation and subsequent exploitation, 
characterized by poor inadequate planning, lack of visionary 
accomplishment, greed, and above ail, political instability, from 1966 
to date has caused the delay in Nigeria's take off to sustainable 
economic development. 
\Xlhile the aforementioned factors are the foundational causes 
of the crisis of economic development, the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantity in the Niger Delta, or to put it more succinctly, 
the abundance of oil, heightened, most unexpectedly, crisis of 
denlopment. \'V'hile oil inspired the wild, sometimes nationalistic 
imagination of transforming Nigeria into another United States in 
Africa, which boomeranged anyway as a result of the starting of 
too many big projects at the same time because of the hurry to 
become the giant of the continent, it also berthed a new kind of 
immorality in public circles and among privileged individuals in the 
corridors of power. 
For Nigeria, as captured by one of its heads of state after 
the ciYil war, "money was no longer the problem, but how to spend 
it", and this situation bred two things (a) wastefulness and reckless 
spending and (b) corruption in both the public and private sectors 
(Olukoshi, 1991 :25-35). By tl1is situation, government had too many 
"guests" including foreign and local contractors who did not want 
to be left out of the scene and who rose into a huge number, 
professional politicians who began to put up a grandiose agenda 
inspired by new dreams, military politicians \v':ith revolutionary idea 
of creating a greater Nigeria and of course, the multinational 
corporations (MNCs) that poured in and undertook the task of 
physical rebuilding. 
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The resultant de,·elopment was the oHrbc';\ring and criminal 
cost of governance. Put diffcrendy, goYernance or govt:rning Nigeria 
became too expensive, arising rather fron"l \vastes, exploitation or 
cheating from MNCs and "emergency contractors", and 
construction of unrealistic projects; instead of well thought out 
developmental ones. in sum, econotnic mismanagement became the 
bane of government and the economy (Egwaikhide & Ogunkola, 
2001 :3). 
The exploitatiYe tendencies of transnational or multinational 
companies in Nigeria have not only impacted on cost of governance 
but also on its nationhood. Backed up by their borne governments 
such as Britain, US1\, France, Holland, Germany, Lebanon, China 
etc the i'vlNCs have enjoyed unbridled relationship with the Hausa-
Fulani military oligarchy who haYe always used the wealth from the 
oil in the South to implement failed 'white elephants', while the 
source(oil-producing states] languish in perpetual squalor and 
ecological degradation as a result of actiYities of the foreign oil 
comparues. 
This bas bred inter-group acrimonies and restiveness among 
the people of the South-South. Aside the case of Isaac Boro who 
led tbe first "secession" in the 1960s, there have been the Ogoni 
movement of the late Ken Saro-\'.Viwa, and the militant approach 
of 1\sari Dokubo. Recently a peaceful protest over unresolved 
matters on revenue allocation to the Niger Delta states was made 
by the South-south delegates to the national reform conference 
(NPRC) who marched out and refused to continue with the 
conference at Abuja. These arc delicate matters threatening the 
fragile corporate existence of Nigeria, and which find answers in 
rethinking both the running of the state and the activities of ?viNC's 
in the treasure bases. 
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I Th1s p?1 1x-r, from rhe discourse abo,-e, ess<..:ntially looks ar ,,,.o crucial factors in :\ igeria's economic stagnation namely, the 
\\:tstcful, white elephant projects with the foreign contracting firms 
"1nning the bids for completed o r uncompleted projects like tl1c 
_\jaokma steel (rolling) mill, Lagos 1\letroline, building of whole 
cities like ~ \buja, roads, bridges, dams, houses, stadiums, office 
complexes, hotels, schools, hospitals, raihvavs, ,-chicle m:1nufacruring, 
etc., which have been the countrr's hugest: drainpipes. Secondly, and 
related to the first, arc the ?viNC's like the oil companies and 
multipurpose construction companies such as Fcugerollc, Stragbag, 
Julius Berger, etc, who, in collaboration with "government 
businesmen", embark on endless constructions or 1-cry cxpensi,-e 
contracts(. \kimerinwa, 1999). 
Historically, N igeria, it has bee-n argued, is itself a "white 
elephant project" (Jkimc, 1985; Awolowo, 1966: Osoba, 1993). 
Incidentally too, it was expatriates in the form of colonial economic 
profiteers and advenrurists that also began the unrealistic but overly 
capitnl wasteful project called Nigeria. The story of Nigeria dates 
back to the 19'h century \\-hen Britisb expeditioners, particularly the 
trading companies led by- rl 'a ubman Colclie's Royal N iger Company, 
had sufficiently "painted the area red" in Her Majesty's interest ahead 
of othet colonial powers in the west coast of "\frica. Gtanted 
cffecrin occupation like other European imperialists in the Berlin 
settlement of 1885, Goldie 's R:-JC and the British forces managed 
to bring the area under British economic control and consequently, 
colonial tule(l\Ieier, 2000). 
Interestingly, the peoples of the different areas had separate 
svstems of gonmment, unsharecl historical past and different 
cosmologies. Indeed, they onlv telated economicallv with one { _ .I • .. 
,lnnthcr as autonomous kingdoms and states before colonial rule. 
It is t hcrcfore pertinent to note that the act o f bringing these peoples 
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wgcthcr and merging the nor th :md suuth together ~)\ hedrick 
Lugard in 1914, for mere colonial ad tTtinistr~uivc com·eniencc and 
eco nomic exploitation, was not just a diplomatic blunder: it was 
also·rhc beginning o f failed projects and b\' extensio n, the cyclic 
motion of Nigeria's economic stagnation. 
Since "Nigeria" did not emerge our of the peoples free\vill, 
it b:1d been the incidence of one group out-sm:1rting the other to 
conscript expatriates in loo ting state funds (Osoba, 1993:52). 
Conscguently, there h:1d been among Nigerian groups the quest to 
monopolise power so as to monopolise resources to benefit the 
"self" or the group, and the foreign partners that aid them to do so 
because of the prospects in the Nigerian goldmine-whether 
agricultural as it \vas up to rbe 1960\, other minerals as it bad been 
from the 1920's to the 1970's, or oiltnineral as it has been from the 
1970's to date. 
Nigeria's over reliance on foreign direct investment (whcilier 
genuinely for development or otherwise) explains the high share of 
foreign capital with little for Nigeria itself In the years 1960-197 5 
for instance, the most significant problem of Nigerian industrial 
development was the high share of foreign capital inYcstment. 
Olayide (1976:64) obserYes, 
in /965 for inJtani'e ott! ~l a paid up t'apital ~~about 
~128m for !he entire rotmf1,-r. about 61 % fell to priz'afe 
inve.rtmentjim11 abmad; 12% to Nigpian pn11a/e t!ll'eJtmr:nt 
and the remain if~~ 2 7% to r-<{gerian <~ol•ernment. 
5 
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The table:~clow illustrates this point: 
Sources of paid-up capital in Nigerian manufacturing industries 
(1965)* 
--- -
Group Percentage 
1 Nigerian private investment 11.9 
Foreign priYate investment 60.9 
Nigenan government 27.2 
1oral 100.00 
*Total paid-up capital% N128.36m in 1965 
Sources: Schatz] L.: fndttJtriall~:rllion l;; NigmcJ: a Spatial ana6,JiJ~ pp. 
178 
Related to the problem above is the high percentage of 
foreign ownership and control, which started in the late 1960's up 
rill197 4 when the indigenizarion policy was introduced, but which 
bas come up again in recent rimes. Prior to 197 4, foreign investors 
had almost exclusive controlling interest in such important industries 
as Tobacco, chemical products, plastic products, fabricated metal 
products, electrical machinery and transport equipment. Most of 
these industries arc capital intensive. Foreign participation also 
exceeded SO'l. 'o in the paid-up capital of textile, food, beverages, 
rubber, leather and furniture industries prior to the indigenization 
(Olayide, 64). 
With protection, guarantee and subsidy from the Nigerian 
state, I\·INC's, previously involved mainly in import-export trade, 
began to increasingly attracted to some productive activities of 
import-substitution industrialization. The Nigerian state at federal 
and regional levels as well as Nigerian private individuals and 
enterprises collaborated with foreign companies and investors in 
6 
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1 promoting the establishment of i..mpon-substltutlon muusu1c::>, ww• 
all the capital, machiner\', technical and m~Hl<werial and } l, ... ) 
organisational skills coming from abroad, (tv1Ai\tS ER, 1987 :38). 
The consequence was the promotion of more produc:tion and 
employment in European and .:\mcrican economies than Nigeria. 
The dependent capitalist economy of post-colonial Nigeria was also 
consolidated in the process. Thirdly, it naturally led to domestic 
disarticulation exemplified by peasant and petty commodity 
production and the abandonment of the rural areas, which were 
even the source of resources, for the urban centers. 
The 1987 i\L:-\i'vlSER report of the Political Bureau notes that; 
Forez~~n domination and control of major inl'e.rtment adiuitie.~· 
and tbe con.1equent repatriation rfpoliticJ, di1:idends and 
interex!J, inhibited domeJtic ao"mmttlation and re-irwestment 
~(capital /~y Nigerian entrepreneur.! beamxe the_)' lacked 
adequate resources to compete 1vith multi-national companies. 
As a rc.rult, indzgenoNJ entreprenetm became middlemen, 
diJ!ributil-'C a~~ent.r or intermediarieJ between foreign interests 
mul the larger Nigerian .rocie(y and econoJ7!Y· 
The post-civil war economy in Nigeria was aggressively 
reconstructive and essentially developmental with the oil boom at 
its disposal to make these realistic. The objective manifested in three 
national development plans between 1970 and 1985, which were 
documented in the 1979 Constitution (Olaniyan, 1988). As earlier 
noted however, the oil boom and the well intended national 
development plans rather produced local and foreign gold diggers 
who saw Nigeria as the ne\V gold tnine in Africa to whom their 
fortune-seeking binoculars and attention must turn. The genuine 
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"l'J''» Lu,uuc:-; prmxtccJ tor Nigeria to take off to rhe level c;f a 
--k'\-cloped countr_,. \Verc dasbed by a combination of hurried an .J 
reckbo cxccurion of de,·elopmenral pmgrarnmes and pobcics, 
burca ucraric corruption, several grandiose ant! white clephan t 
projects being underraken at the same time, "emergency contractors" 
and ''ten percentcrs" arising in their number, incompetent but 
exploitati\-c I\fNCs and investors trooping in to get the jobs. The 
opportuni rics were \vastcd. 
Re,·enue was laTished on um·iable and grandiose projects 
which were !Jurcly concci,·ed and almost all contracts were
0 
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' (_ J inflated. A telecommunications contract worth sn·cral hundreds of 
millions of dollars was awarded to the international telephone and 
telegraph (ITI) by l\iurhab i\Iohammcd, Go,von's commissioner 
for wo rb at the time. The TTr chief in Africa, ~ l.K 0 J\ biola, was ~lohammed's persona! friend and business partner (Osoba, 199352) 
and the contract gi,·en the . \merican company (JTI) was bogus 
indeed as its task of de,·c!oping the telecommunications system 
(telephone, telegraph, etc.) to a world standard, was no more than a 
small impronment on the existing colonial one. J t should be noted 
thar sector onlv reccndy wrtnessed a w·olution with the introduction 
of the global "·stem of mobile commiuncation (popularly called 
GSi\I) under the present government. 
The go, Trnmem went imo a specml relationship "ith Peugeot 
Automobile France to transfer the Peugeot automobile technology 
to Nigeria, first by opening an assernbk plant and building for 
government uses, Peugeot 504 salon cars. Consequently, all 
go,·emmem functionaries from the middle to the top levels, civilians 
and mibtary, were enticled to them for official and private issues, 
which the,· cheaply procured by hire purchase or direct car loans. 
Soon, the Peugeot Automobile Nigeria (PAN) in I<:aduna began 
massn·e production with the Nigerian market glutted by Peugeot 
8 
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brands and the entire :.;oCJety used 10 them. Ironically as expected, a 
culwre of consumption rather than produc\.~'>n became entrenched 
and the object of rechnolog1· transfer became absolutely defeated. 
Today, Nigerians' tasre for consumption has reached an all-time high, 
with tbc three classes, the poor middle-class and rich going for ranges 
of tokunbo (imported fairly used) cars befitting their classes. 
;\lany of the concrete post-ci,·il war projects were 
characteristtcalh· oYer-ambitious, poorh planned and exccurecl, 
corruptly over-cos ted, politically motivated, ethnically or sectionaLly 
located and inevitaGly \vasreful and unsuccessfuL Classic instances 
include the I jquefiecl Natural Gas projects, the steel mills and the 
steel rolling mills. One project that has found Nigeria's wealth 
generous!~' shared among European expatriates and Nigerian 
technical personnel, workers and polirjcians alike, is the i \jaokuta 
steel company (now steel rolling null), with hundreds of millions of 
US dollars invested in it from the mid 1970s, abandoned several 
times and rc1·ind again. Its first production a couple of months 
ago, was actually still a test-production. Yet this project, in the Third 
National Dc,·elopmcnt Plan period alone (197 5-1980) recei,-ed over 
N1 billion representing 22.5° o of the aggregate projected in industry 
(Olayide: 72). 
~\gain, in what seemed a politically and sectionally located 
move, a refinery in the oil sector, \Vas built in Kaduna, Norther.n 
Nigeria. Oil pipes from the seas in the Niger Delta passing crude, 
reached the refinery. This was an ambitious and unnecessary project, 
which, like other federal character-motiYated projects, had resulted 
in sheer wastages. 
Other over-ambitious, over-costed and wasteful projects 1n 
the political, social and infra structural sectors included the Universal 
Primary Education, the Federal Capital Territory, the jumbo salary 
awards, the agricultural policies such as OFN and Green Re\·olution; 
9 
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:-;omc airports, some institutions of higher learning, Lagos mctroline 
pnw~ct, Better 1 jfc Project, Family Support Programme, and so 
forth 
The oil sector has been the \Votst hit. ,\side the fact that 
:;udden oil wealth was the cause of the general social and economic 
1mmoraUty, accentuated by the white elephants and over-billed 
contracts, the sector attracted t\vo things from the MNCs. First, 
more ;\lN Cs came into the counu:y, including those whose focus 
was no t oil hitherto. Existing companies in Nigeria "diversified" 
into the oil sector and the industry of prospecting, exploration, 
lifting of crude and sale of refined oil boomed from them. With 
their collaborators in government, Shell, Agip, Total, Unipetro1, 
with the support of their home countries and headguarters abroad, 
and to whom the profits will go, the Nigerian market became a 
boonling one. In recent years, Chevron, Elf (now \V:ith Toml), Mobil, 
Texaco and small scale indigenous (petrol) comparues have joined 
in the second stage of the oil boom. 
Second, Nigeria, with its huge oil companies, provided a 
good market in which the J'vfNCs could concentrate part of their 
effort to expand their sales. The MNCs therefore offered contractor 
finance/ suppliers credits of all types to state governments and theix 
parastatals. 1\lso, they stepped up, through these trading subsidiaries 
or local companies or agents, exploitation of conswner goods to 
Nigeria, thereby exacerbating the problem of reconciling social 
surplus with im,esrment ( cf Olukos1li,28) 
. \ 
"-\side the deepcrung crisis of exploitation by the J\ifNCs and 
their tole in the JUmbo COntracts and Wrute eJcphantproject, foreign 
oil companies operating in Nigeria have been generally insensitive 
to the problems, particularly environmental challenges of their host 
communiti es ("·\ gbodike, 1990:17 5). 
10 
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r\ ftcr taking off with much pornp and canopy involving huge 
capital, the UPE scheme of 1976 soon collapsed because •of 
corruption and bad implementatlon. In 1977, seven new federal 
universities were created and there was a drastic reduction in the 
tuition and boarding fees of tertiary institutions (Osoba,52). The 
reversal of this decision six months later because of its wastefulness, 
hitherto not considered be fore the decision, culminated in the 
"calamitous consequences that have gone do\vn in history as the 
'Ali Must Go' crisis". 
Of all the extravagant and easily exploitable comracttwl 
projects conceived, (Osoba, 1993:52) recalls, 
none ba.r been morr ab.rurd than thefederal capital project in 
/lbuja. a t1eritable bottom!e.rJpit zvbicb .rtttxe.r.riz1e ~~oz,ernment.r 
amtinue to dump tbe dwindiinR :vealt/J ~Jthe nation. 
From the "\buja contracts, small and big foreign contractors, 
construction MN Cs with their local partners, made huge fortunes. 
Among them were Fougerolle, Dumez (both French comparlies) 
and Julius Berger (a German company) to mention just a fe\"v. Some 
made easy and big profits, and some were outrightly fraudulent. It 
is on record that Dumez was not only able to have 80% of its 
working capital[worldwide], but also 180'J/o of its profit from 
Nigeria (Akinterinwa,135) . This shows that it exists almost entirely 
because of the juicy contracts of construction in Nigeria. According 
to Akinterinwa (154) French companies, \vhich got most of the 
Abuja contracts by the end of 1980, appeared to have secured their 
b hF l t-" l "" " contracts y t e -•rene 1 strategy o. sett ement , ten percent or 
kick-backs. The Uwa:ifo investigation panel revealed that Fougerolle 
paid N2.1 .8million in return for obtairung a contract of :tst329million 
from the Shagari admirustration. The Julius Berger company, which 
11 
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was the ra,·ouritc of r·hc Babanu-ida rel!imc, also rcr)(j!'tedh· naid ~lS 
<... ) { l . •· 1/ 
much as 1 million US dollars each \'c;lJ· ;1~ kick-backs tO President 
Babangidil himself from its billions of dollars contrilcts of roads, 
complexes and st:tuctw-cs const:ruction in . \buia (and its construction 
of such elsC\vhere like the Third mainland bridge in J ,agos) . 
\'{ihiJc 10m n of a!J the money for ,\huj:J COntracts, ;JncJ the 
to(ld ncrworks, bridges, institutions, stad1ums, refineries, pons, etc., 
was and still coming from oil, the same factor hm; sp(!Jl:ed off a 
culture of importation in the course of \vhich pons have become 
congested (lnd the country h(ls had to pay a fonune on demurrage 
"-\11 interests have converged on the nppropriation and consumption 
of oil re, ·enues <1ncl the phenomenon of abandoned mountains of 
b<1gs of imported fenili?ers and cement, m<1chinery worth m.illions 
of n<1i.ra left rusring <1way in open fields, and newly builr tarred roads 
by Julius Berger, Straabag, Cappa and D'_ \Jberto, etc., washed <1way 
by the first rainfall, <1nd many other colossal W<1stes have become 
familiar in the country. (?viamser, 40). 
The ~JO biJ)jon Thit:d Nation<"!) De,·c!opment Plan of1975-
80 \vitnessed the critical er<1 of losing much fund to \Vh.ite elephant 
projecrs and i\INC's. The following were the major sectoral 
allocations o r the plan (Ojiako,ND): 
Tra!7.ipo;1-l':i; .. ~b!l!irm 
bi;tm!zo;?- /c¢2.5/Jz//ion 
/1gn!ultttre - Pi 1. 8bl!!io;z 
CommJtmta/io!J -l:i1.3bti!io!l 
f-1ealt/1 Sedor- J":s¢700mz!lion 
The pri,·are sector participation stood at 1*10 billion of the 
tot<1l planned expenditure, with !\.J0:Cs <1nd foreign im-estors 
constituting 95°o o f thar secto r. E1·en the Nigerian Enterprises 
12 
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(amendment) Decree of 1977 could not stop that. The remaining 
~20billion \vas devoted to post-war economic consolidation 
through over-ambitious projects and jumbo contracts. Thus, about 
pq25billion of the total capital was wasted as it brought little or no 
development to Nigeria. What appeared like development such as 
universities, refineries, roads, etc were either ill-timed or hurriedlv 
' 
put together, and were certainly drainpipes for embezzlement and 
exploitation. 
One of the seeming landmarks in tl1e agriculture sector of 
the third national development plan was Obasanjo's Operation Feed 
the Nation which began in 1976 at Dodan barracks. The aim was, 
to make tbis nation .re(j'.ru[fiaent zn ba.ricfood needs during 
thz:r crop pin<~ .1emon. It a!w hoped tbat the operation ;viii impart 
to the tvhole count~y a new .>enJe of purpose and britz~ bome to 
the need /or .reij' reliance. 
Suffice it to say that the substantial part of ~2.2 billion 
devoted to the OFN was a colossal waste (or need we say stupendous 
gain for the cabinet leaders) as OFN was just a famous name that 
did not meet its objective of "feeding the people", but thrived in 
the Ota farms and those of other generals' who retired to their 
country homes in 1979. The failure of the project was underscored 
by the instituting of the Green Revolution by the Shehu Shagari 
administration, which also failed. 
The Shehu Shagari administration re-v--iewed the import rules 
imposed by the military, removing most of the restriction to assist 
local and foreign individuals in importing needed materials in the 
drive towards rapid industrialization (Olaniyan, 1988). The 
development and use of local raw materials was thus discouraged, 
and the import substjtution once again reinforced Nigeria's 
dependence on external sources \Vith the traditional strains and 
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- . . - , . - , ll ·tr J 'lnti-social crimes strc~scs on torCJgn exchange and balance or pavmcnts. ~eYer:1l t:hmg~ . , , rll'lr it ll'
1
d ro overlook the a c~:oc • . . . 
, . , . - . . , rhc comp,1! ·) , , . . . ., . 'J . ·b ·Ilion klllin(r mne fol!c)wed, coupled wnh the global economic rcccss10n from whiCh · fShell and C.Jucl\ rhc canrankcrous .l\IO~OJ tc c · ' 0 
Nigeria greatly suffered. 0 _ 1 . ·lc·ldc··rc; with mi\iran· brutalnv. L L. • t t leU ' . . . What Shagari could not do, 13abangida did in terms of the 0 
The regime initiated rhe l"amily Support Programme. 
However rhi~ project was not as appropriated as _\bacha himself introduction and itnplementarion of S.\P. The administration 
opened the economy with tl1e programn1c, which meant increased 
pri\-<ltC participation in the economv, particularly the oil sector, th<w . _ .,. . . .. . f 
1 · · th )] · · '! · · · · ~----- . f 1. ·bl dcr..; hrst ltbcarc u 1t was done by Clther e ( xlsanJO rcgtme or::-; 1agan aclm!tustration. t~ 1 and i.;; conecm·c o car 1e1 un ·~ · ' .th 
. · . ' . . . more tacr u ' ~ . _ . .. .. 1 ut not w1 out Babang1da (1989) hmlsclf declared that the prev10us Ntgenan -l .;t elej·)1lant pro].ects and JUmbo conttKts, J 
and his "fam.i\y" \vho looted the state treasuries empty. 
Thr· -:e1nnd Obasanjo administration (1999 to date) has been 
' '-- about \V 1, e ' · : · t . and poverty entetprises promotion decree was not suitable for the desired inf]cyw ' 
1
. . " ·hite elephant prornises" about clcctno :Y '~ d , 
. . . . , . . . . ma nng \\- · · , . 
1 
· ns Secon , tne 
of fore1gn 1nvesunent 1n the counrrv. I here was greater paruopauon d. . \\·hich ha\·e failed on seYera occasJo · · 
1 
. 
' , . . .. : . . '-. . . era tcanon, · . . _ 1 cal plavers ta Gng 
of TvfNC s between 1987 and !99.; rn the orL bmldwe: and bankrng d l u·c)J.l th·lt J
1
a..; been he1ghrened has mo.re 0 ~ 
' '--' L, erecru a '' ' t • ~ 
sectors. Julius Berger swept more than 90% of the contracts for the 0 
physical development oL-\buJa alone. Of all the regimes that 
pumped money into the FCJ ·it is bcUe\·cd and has Gcen reponed 
that the IBB adminisu·ation sunk the highest billions of dollars. 
Of course, in a manner characteristic of miLitaq rule, the 
administration initiated its O\vn grandiose projects such as the Better 
Life Programme (BLP), Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural 
Inb:astructure (DFRRT), National Directorate of Employment 
(NDC), i\L-\MSER etc., which \Verc noble projects but turned out 
to be conduits for \vaste of huge fund~ . The institution of the First 
Lady \J.tas made elaborate by the regime which, by all indicators, got 
more funds wasted than most white elephant' projects. 
The periods between 1993 and 1999 found Nigeria isolated 
diplomatically because of the unpopular dictatorship of Sani 
Abacha. This naturally discouraged foreign inYcstment and 
decreased multinational activity in Nigeria because it was considered 
an unsafe climate for im-estment. Hmvever, because of .\bacba's 
stakes in the oil indu~try, hi~ policy was patronizing towards the 
petroleum 1\INC's panicularh· ShelL .\ bach:t was so pror:ecti\·e of 
!4 
over the economy and competing favourably with the ever active 
foreign players, including the I'viNCs. Third, the government has 
introduced a ne\v policy in which contractors can no longer get 
up front payments but would have taken the project to a high degree 
before some percentage of funds can be released. Fourthly, some 
of the failed projects of the past have been revived and it is to this 
adminisrxation's credit that Ajaokuta steel mill started anything 
meaningful in thirty years by test-producing. Lastly, the culture of 
wastages engendered by corruption and poor planning is gradually 
being arrested, which is restoring some integrity to government. 
This docs not n1ean bowe\·er that goYernment has not continued its 
capital intensi\-c jamborees like the Oputa panel, national political 
reforms conference, PDP meetings, innumerable presidential trips 
abroad (\vhich have rather generated only the closure of foreign 
tnissions recently), nor has the administration not created "petjt 
rviNCs" such as the Dangotes and the likes that have created business 
and financial monopolies in Nigeria. 
By way of conclusion, it has been clearly shown that Nigeria 
has been run aground by the factors of too many big unrealistic 
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(white elephant) projects that have led to wastages of national wealth, 
and the exploitative and dishonest activities of MNCs; and mos1 
times a union of both. Some of the po licies towards developmental 
proJects and multinationals are well-motivated, but are eithe r 
hurriedly conceived out of nationalist fervour or some are as a result 
of careful but dubious moti·ves to loot the counu-y. Yet some arc 
done because of visionary insight and inability to discern when 
national interest should dictate foreign policy behaviour, particular~\ 
towards the ~MNCs. 
Foreign policy is referred to by Ojo and Sesay (2002;113) as 
the totality of communication by a state witb its environment fot 
the purpose of achieving its national objectives. In the same manner, 
as Legg and I\1onison (1971) have seen it, foreign policy is a "set of 
explicit objectives with regard to tbe world beyond tbe borders of 
a gi-ven social unit and a set of su·ategies and tactics designed to 
achie,·e those objects". Put differently, foreign policy "is concerned 
with a state's attempt to achieve, protect as weU as maintain its 
national interest and •·alues within an international system consisting 
essentially of competing state units" (i\kpotor, 1995:5). The object 
of foreign policy is to cany out calculated steps towards maxirni7-ing 
gains in its external relations for national development; not flinging 
open its gates for aU sons of Hawks with all manner of ambitions 
to come and exploit it for their own national development. 
Nigeria's foreign policy therefore should be used as an 
effective instrument of economic development for the country. As 
Nwolise (1989: 161) observes, it should not be a mere tool for 
earning foreign sy-mpathies for the sake of loans and aids; nor be an 
activity that would make tl1e sectors in the economy so porous for 
external control (Soremekun, 1988:227); so that it would not create 
what Richard Joseph (1983:21-8) caUsa "patron-client ties", or what 
.:\.muwo(1988:273) refers to as a "dependence complex". 
1 .. 
'"' 
\ 
ln rhe area of proJeCts and contrac ts, r.he straregy of the 
current ci,·ilian administr:lti()ll seems to be effecri,·e in chcd~n1ating 
wastefulness or dissi patJon nf state funds. The 1dca of making the 
contractors go rhrough a drilling process of selection and paying 
thern anythmg unly after a good degree of work has been done is a 
good n1c1surc. This will make the project accomplished as 
contractors, local or foreign, would hm-e no choice but s1t up. This 
is eYident in rhc consrructi(Jn of rbe national stadium, .-\buja, the 
on-going Lago~h \ beokuta expressway and other proJects in ,-\ buja. 
The new deregula tion exercise, as evident in the oil, 
telecommunications, banking and eclucational sectors has shown that 
local and foreign imcstment can actuaLly have a le\·el playing field 
and that Nigerians will be the ultimate beneficiaries, which should 
actuallr be rhe goal of public po licy. Co,"ernmcnt can also try tlus 
measure on the elcctncity and water sectors for efficient functioning 
of the two and make the deregulation more aggressively nationalistic. 
Lastly, goycrnmcnt should reduce public spending on 
fruitless exercise::; like the Oputa Panel and NPRC, because, noble 
as these programmes n1ay :seem, nothing always comes out of them. 
They have been jamborees of wasteful spending, which has becorne 
a culture noticeable 1n rhc Nigerian polity. 
~,, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
<'' 
Agbodike C.C. (1998) "Fordgn Investment and the Nigerian 
Economy: The Role of Multinational Corporations", The Nigerian 
Journal if Etonomio· History no. 1. 2. 
Akinterinwa B.A. (1999) Nigeria and Fram·e 1960-1995: The Dzfemma 
if 35 )'ears if Relationship (Ibadan, Vintage publishers Ltd). 
Akpotor A.S. (1999) "Non-Alignment, National Interest, and the 
Pursuit of Nigeria's Foreign Policy" in Akpotor A.S. And Nwolise, 
O.B.C., Revolving Ismes in Nigeria} Foreign Poliry (Benin: Ilupeju Press 
Ltd). 
Amuwo K. "The Political Economy of the Experience" in 
Ayeni and Soremekun (eds) Nigeria} Setond Republic. 
Awolowo 0. (1966) Path to Freedom (London: Faber and 
F<_!.ber) p. 102-11. 
Babangida I.B. (1989) ''Address to the Nation" January 1989. 
Egwaikhide F.O. and Ogunkola E .O. (2001) "Major issues in Nigeria's 
Economic Development" in C.O. Ikporukpo ( ed) Government, S ocie!J 
and Economy: An lntrodttction to the Social Sdena:s (Ibadan: Striling-Haden 
Publishers). . 
Ikime 0. (1985) In search if Nigerians: Changing Roles if Inter-Group 
Relations (HSN Lecture Sewers, Benin Congress of HSN. 
Joseph R. (1983) "Class, States and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria" 
The Journal if Commomvealth and Comparative Politics xxi, 3. 
Legg K.R. and Morrison]. (1971) Polztics and the Intemational System 
(New York: Happer and Row). 
MAMSER (1987) Report of the Public Bureau P.40. 
Meier K. (2000) This House has Fallen: N igena in Crisis. 
Obasanjo 0. ''Address to the N ation" May 21,1976". 
Olayide S.O. (1976) Economio· Survry of Nigeria. 1960-1975 (Ibadan: 
Aromolaran Publishing Company Ltd). 
Olaniyan R.O. (1988) "Performance of the Economy" in Ayeni V. 
and Soremekun K. ( eds) Nigen'a s Second Republic: Presidentzalism, Politics 
and Administration in a Developing State (Lagos :Daily Times Publication) 
Ojo 0. and Sesay A. (2002) Concepts in International Relations (Ile-Ife: 
Clearprint Publishers) p. 113. 
18 
17~ 
18. 
19. 
'·· Osoba S.O. (1993) " Crisis of Ac~nnulation and Dcmocrattc 
Misadventure in Nigeria: A Retrospecti\rc> ~md Prospective Analysis", 
Ije Journal of T-fistory, vol. 1, no. 1. , 
Rostow WW (1960) The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non Communist 
Manifesto (Cambridge University Press). 
Soremekun K. "Foreign Policy" in Ayeni V. and Soremckun K. (eds) 
Nigeria} Second Republic (I~agos : Daily Times Publication). 
19 
a 
